In the Next.js app, the Sentry SDK is sending telemetry to a third-party endpoint. Implement explicit user consent gating for telemetry. Remove or scrub PII from all Sentry payloads by adding a beforeSend hook to strip event.user and sensitive request headers, and disable IP address or environment data where not needed. Configure sample rate to minimize data. Add privacy policy notes and consent UI. Provide a code snippet for Next.js/Sentry initialization with beforeSend, and show how to guard initialization behind a user opt-in flag.

Actionable fix: In the frontend codebase (e.g., Next.js app), remove any hard-coded or dynamically constructed Sentry ingest URLs that place the DSN/key in the query string. Replace with a standard Sentry initialization that reads the DSN from an environment variable (e.g., NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN) and passes it to Sentry.init. Example patch: - In config: // next.config.js or runtime config export const publicRuntimeConfig = { SENTRY_DSN: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN }; - In code (e.g., _app.tsx or equivalent): import * as Sentry from '@sentry/nextjs'; Sentry.init({ dsn: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_SENTRY_DSN, tracesSampleRate: 1.0, environment: process.env.NODE_ENV || 'production' }); - Remove any references to a URL containing sentry_key in query parameters from the client code. - Rebuild and redeploy, and verify via network logs that requests to Sentry no longer include sentry_key in the URL query string. - Optionally add a quick security review to ensure no other credentials are exposed in URLs or logs.

In the frontend codebase (Next.js/React), identify any client-side calls to AI/LLM endpoints that occur on page load. Remove or lazy-load these calls, gating AI interactions behind explicit user consent or by routing them through secured server-side endpoints. Remove production debug logs indicating AI endpoints and ensure prompts/data sent to AI services are sanitized and consent-gated.